Ripple Effect

A journal of memories, impressions, ideas and mistakes.

Wednesday, January 05, 2005

Daily Bulletin, 26 February 1963
Headquarters 2D Logistical Command (C), U.S. Army
Fort Lee, Virginia

I look through these bulletins for any mention of Viet Nam, any foreshadowing of what is to come. There is nothing. There is an announcement of an Annual Mandatory Security Orientation. Guest instructors in "Chemical Corps" on "New Developments in CBR" which is classified secret, and in "Meat Merchandising" for the Commissary Open Class. No kidding. The soldiers are offered chain of command photographs of General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. There are parking regulations, bridge reminders (the game, not logistics), and the EM wives monthly meeting.

Oh, here's a good one: "BB Guns, Bows and Arrows:" (how long ago WAS 1963 anyway????) Turns out it's addressed to parents. "Increasing damage to windows of unoccupied buildings and light bulbs, together with the ever present danger of personal injury from the unsupervised use of BB guns and bows and arrows, indicates a lack of supervision on the part of parents and a non-compliance with Post Regulations."

And a few months later, what was going on in the real world? Good thing the kids were honing up on their BB guns and bows and arrows!

U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM: WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, OCTOBER 2, 1963
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Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the following statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.
1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam.
2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.
3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it.
Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn.
4. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.
5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.
By early l963, Washington was in a mood of euphoria about Vietnam.
Saigon Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.(3)
We are now launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government . . . . there is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration.
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 29 August 1963(4)

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